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The Influence of Transnational Policy Networks on Effective Multistakeholder  
Participation in the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society

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## Abstract

In December 2003, the UN convened the first phase of World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a process designed explicitly to stimulate the development of an emerging international regime for the governance of the information and communication technologies and policies on which the information and knowledge society is being built. The broad scope of these deliberations – domain names to cultural heritage – raises the stakes for these normally arcane global information and communication policy processes, which is complicated even further by the increasingly multistakeholder nature of participation. This paper investigates the degree to which transnational policy networks are present within the WSIS processes, explores their linkages with knowledge producing epistemic communities, and assesses their impact on effective participation in the Summit. Four primary research questions shape this paper: (1) To what extent do transnational policy-actor networks exist within the WSIS policy formulation processes? (2) What is the relationship, if any, between these policy-actor networks and existing epistemic communities? (3) What factors most significantly influence participation in a transnational policy-actor network within WSIS?; (4) What factors most significantly influence effective participation in WSIS? Using both qualitative and quantitative data from an international survey and participant observation at WSIS and its preparatory processes, we find significant evidence of policy networks, and their influence on the effective participation of delegates. However, while we do find a significant relationship between country status and membership in a policy network, we find no such relationship on linkages with epistemic communities.

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With the continued progress of globalization and the on-going development of a knowledge society, global information and communication policy issues are becoming increasingly important on the world stage. Substantive policy issues ranging from intellectual property, domain names, infrastructure development, to culturally sensitive content creation are on the agenda for international policy makers. One of the reasons for such a focus on these issues is that the Global Information Infrastructure (GII), known more recently as Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins et al, 2003), is being seen as increasingly important to a range of new actors, interested in using the GII for socio-economic development objectives ranging from telemedicine and distance learning, to global electronic commerce. Collectively, many of these issues are falling under the rubric of Internet governance, both narrowly defined in terms of technical coordination, and more broadly defined, in terms of resource allocation and policy formulation (Internet Governance Project, 2004)..

Since the 1960s, communication scholars and political scientists have tried to understand the underlying mechanisms that facilitate international cooperation and collaboration in global policy processes (Gourevitch, 1978; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Axelrod, 1985; Keohane & Nye, 1989). Several contributing factors have been identified, including economic power and military might (Keohane, 1984; Keohane & Nye, 1989), agenda setting (Schattschneider, 1960; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Kingdon, 1996), and most recently global policy or issue networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2001; Haufler, 2001; Rischard, 2002). Out of this work, one of the broadest and most interesting conceptual mechanisms identified by these scholars has been

international regimes and their role in the global governance of specific issue areas within international affairs (Gourevitch, 1978; Krasner, 1983; Cowhey, 1990).

In previous research (Cogburn, 2002; 2003), I developed a theoretical model of global GII governance in which international policy conferences play a critical role in regime formation. These conferences, and their preparatory processes, comprise the key strategic locations in which networks of policy-actors (Bockman & Eyal, 2002) practice “conference diplomacy” (Young, 1995) and mobilize knowledge resources from “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1990) to contest the fundamental principles, values, and norms of the emergent regime. In this work, I argued that a new regime to govern the GII is emerging; with two competing foci – maximizing social welfare and maximizing economic goals – and that policy-actors from developing countries have been far less effective participants in these processes than have developed countries. Ó Siochrú, (2004) calls this the emergence of a technically-oriented “information” society, as compared to a people-oriented “communication” society.<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations sponsored-World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), is one example of these emergent regime formation processes. In December 2003, the first phase of WSIS was held in Geneva, Switzerland as a comprehensive global approach to these information and communication policy issues; and a second phase is now underway to culminate in November 2005 in Tunisia.

Central amongst the issues being negotiated and developed within the WSIS process is the UN Secretary General’s Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). However, one of the most unique aspects of WSIS is that it involves a global multistakeholder approach, meaning

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<sup>1</sup> These distinctions are evident in many sectors. For example, in South Africa, many community activists have urged us to use the name “information communities” instead of society; and other scholars, such as Robin Mansell has urged the formulation of knowledge societies, the plural wording representing a wider variation in possible alternative social structures.

that not only are government representatives involved in the complex negotiations and preparatory processes of the Summit, but so are private sector and civil society actors from around the world. How do these various stakeholders participate in the processes of global information and communication technology policy formulation as illustrated by WSIS?

Following the groundbreaking work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and others, we argue transnational advocacy networks are likely to have a significant impact on participation in the Summit. However, we are not just interested in “participation” in terms of simply one’s physical presence at an international conference, but what we have been calling “effective participation.” Effective participation suggests that a policy-actor has agency within the policy environment, and that they are ready, willing, and able to engage with the intricacies of the global information and communication policy environment.

In this paper, we explore the degree to which transnational advocacy networks are active in WSIS and investigate their impact on several aspects of effective participation. Using both qualitative and quantitative data from an international survey of WSIS participants, interviews with WSIS policy leaders, and participant observation at the Geneva Summit and its preparatory processes, we explore the factors that influence involvement in policy networks and seek to better understand their linkages with epistemic communities. Finally, we analyze the potential for a new organizational form – the policy collaboratory – to strengthen the development of these transnational policy networks and to expand their linkages with epistemic communities.

## Literature Review

### *International Policy Processes*

In his classic analysis of US domestic policy processes, John Kingdon (1984) suggests public policy processes can be divided into four broad categories, which are: (1) agenda setting;

(2) specification of alternatives; (3) choosing between the specified alternatives; and (4) implementation of the decision (pg. 12). Kingdon's focus is on the first two phases of the policy processes, namely how ideas and issues get onto the decision-making agenda, and how the various alternatives get specified. We are also interested in these two phases, because it is here that developing countries and civil society organizations appear to have been less effective than the more powerful countries of the world. One of Kingdon's central conclusions is that the agenda setting and alternative delineating components of the policy process are critical to the ultimate development of policy outcomes. This assertion is in line with the classic argument by Schattschneider (1960), who argues that, "the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power."

The political science and communications literature suggests that the ability for external forces – such as print and broadcast media – to shape what individuals think about is an important function of soft power. McCombs and Shaw (1972) introduced the term “agenda setting” into the political science and communications literature with their landmark study, of Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They were able to show an almost perfect correlation between the frequency and types of issues covered in the print and broadcast media available in Chapel Hill and issues concerning voters in the area. McCombs and Shaw (1972) preceded a range of studies mostly confirming the agenda setting hypothesis. However, while this body of literature has grown, few scholarly studies have examined the effect of agenda setting in international relations (for two exceptions, see Keohane & Nye, 1998; Soroka, 2003).

However, Checkel (2001), along with many others, argues persuasively for us to remember that domestic-level political processes do not occur in a vacuum, and that international or system-level processes heavily influence these domestic processes. He suggests, “theories

that analyze domestic ‘decision processes as well as [systematically/structurally influenced] decision outcomes are stronger theories than those which purport merely to explain outcomes’ (McKeown, cited in Checkel 2001, p. 5-6).

### *Regime Theory and Global Governance*

In the broad interdisciplinary field of international studies a group of scholars has studied problems surrounding the evolution of global cooperation and global governance in the absence of global government (Gourevitch, 1978; Keohane & Nye, 1989; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Axelrod, 1985). These problems, sometimes called the “anarchy problematique,” stem from the reality that the international system consists of anarchic nation-states possessing de jure sovereignty and equality. While the de facto reality frequently differs, de jure sovereignty means that no one state actor in the world-system can “force” any other state actor into action against its will. In this state of global anarchy, how is global governance (e.g., the development of rules, allocation of resources, enforcement, and predictability) achieved, especially on issues that are transnational in scope and importance? Over the past two decades, scholars have attempted to address this problem by positing the existence of a construct called international regimes.

Krasner (1983) forged a consensus around the theoretical and applied approaches to international regime theory, which they defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given areas of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Principles are seen as beliefs of fact, causation or rectitude; Norms are seen as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations; Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; and Decision-Making Procedures are the prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1983). Rittberger (1995) argues that international regime theory has maintained exceptional

stability and integrative capabilities within the discipline of international relations, and includes insights from international political economy, comparative politics, and other areas in world affairs. Subsequently, several scholars have improved upon the approach. For example, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000) enhanced its explanatory power by integrating the diverse strands of international regime theory. Each of these strands has articulated and defended a distinct view on the origins, stability, and consequences of international regimes.” As a result, over the last several decades, scholars have documented the emergence and efficacy of international regimes in a variety of issue areas, including: shipping, air transport, post, atomic energy and weapons, environmental issues, the global “commons” (e.g., the high seas and outer space), diamonds, and , telecommunications.

Using regime theory, scholars have identified one of the oldest and most successful international regimes, the international telecommunications regime (Drake, 1989; Cowhey, 1990; Zacher and Sutton, 1996; Frieden, 1996). Based on the ITU and an epistemological community that supported the concept of a natural monopoly for telecommunications, and the “clubby” and “cartelized” relationships between ministries and officials of monopoly Post, Telegraph and Telephone entities (PTTs), ITU officials, and a limited number of upstream suppliers to the PTT in the national capitals, the international telecommunications regime was highly successful (Cowhey, 1990; Frieden, 1996). Numerous studies have explored the role of the ITU and its role in governing international telecommunications (Aronson & Cowhey, 1988). Other studies have shown the exceptionalism of the United States telecommunications market (Horwitz, 1991). More recently, other studies have looked specifically at the role of the WTO and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as embryonic mechanisms for global governance of the GII (Mueller, 2002). However, there has been insufficient attention in the

scholarly literature to developing countries within these processes. In earlier work, I examined the constellation of global and domestic pressures that can combine to influence telecommunications policy formulation in a developing country (Cogburn, 1998c). Expanding on Gourevitch (1989), I developed a theoretical model of these processes and tested it empirically on the telecommunications policy processes in South Africa. This analysis provided a detailed analysis of the institutional mechanisms, both global and domestic, that influenced the restructuring of the sector from 1985-95, including the international telecommunications regime (Cogburn, 1998c).

#### *Transnational Policy-Actor and Advocacy Networks*

While governments have the institutional structure of the international system to support their participation in these policy processes, the private sector and civil society have to create their own (with minimal support from the intergovernmental system). In order to enhance their participation in these processes, many of these actors – public, private, and non-governmental – frequently seek the support of and involvement in the form of what some scholars call policy-actor networks (Slaughter, 2001; Bockman & Eyal, 2002). These networks are a key source of integrating knowledge into the international decision-making process. Finally, Levy, et al. (1995) argues that international organizations are “arenas for conference diplomacy,” seeing these organizations and the international conferences they organize as mechanisms for the pursuit of common goals and as players in the creation and operation of international regimes.

#### *Epistemic Communities*

Most accounts of policy-actor networks have given insufficient attention to the mechanisms through which knowledge and information influence the erosion, establishment, and maintenance of regimes. Knowledge is critical to regime formation. It helps to create the

foundation for international cooperation by, “illuminating complex interconnections that were not previously understood. Knowledge can not only enhance the prospects for convergent state behavior, it can also transcend ‘prevailing lines of ideological cleavage’” (Haas, 1980, p. 367-68).

However, Dimitrov (2003) argues that only some types of scientific knowledge seem to be important in regime formation. It is consensual knowledge, or information around which there is a sufficient consensus from scientists, scholars, and experts, that has the greatest impact on policy formulation. Where there is the collective acceptance of a “schema of interpretation” supported by empirical data and theoretical explanations to provide support for alternatives, policy-makers pay attention (Haas, et al., 1977; Shiffman, 2003).

Perhaps even more importantly, these policy networks play a critical role in mobilizing the knowledge and information necessary to make policy decisions. Knowledge generating communities such as scientists, scholars, research centers/think tanks, and journalists have the potential to comprise epistemic communities. These epistemic communities work to generate the underlying knowledge upon which a policy consensus can be built.

How is this consensus generated? Previous research has shown that epistemic communities can work to promote the convergence of knowledge and interpretive schemas (Haas, 1980, 1990). While the earliest definition of an “epistemic community” comes from Foucault (1973), a more appropriate definition comes later from Haas, et al. (1977). They argue that an epistemic community is, “a network of individuals and groups who are able to influence the future by virtue of their shared specialized knowledge of certain crucial phenomena.” Individuals belonging to an epistemic community “seek to use their knowledge as a way of organizing cognition collectively” (Haas, et al. 1977, p. 38). These epistemic communities

contribute to global governance through their direct and indirect influence of the dense transnational networks of policy-makers and issue stakeholders,

*Inclusive Global Governance: Effective Multistakeholder Participation*

While increasing calls for “multistakeholder” global governance (WEF, 2004) are opening the doors to many of these international conferences for elite actors from civil society organizations and developing countries, evidence suggests that they continue to be *pawns* in these processes rather than true *partners* (Louder Voices, 2003; Cogburn, 2004). Engaging effectively in these global governance processes is difficult for governments, and even the most seasoned private sector actors. It is even more challenging, however, for civil society organizations and developing countries working with limited financial and institutional resources.

Finding effective means to integrate developing countries and civil society organizations into a system of multistakeholder global governance for cyberinfrastructure is proving to be a major challenge. Developing country and civil society stakeholders participating in these “multistakeholder” processes have frequently formed themselves into what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call “transnational advocacy networks.” Each of these transnational advocacy networks may hold differing visions about the continued growth and evolution of cyberinfrastructure, creating additional tension in the development of an information society (Cogburn, 2002, 2003, 2004).

These new actors and their diverse interests are eroding the convergence that once existed within the international telecommunications regime and are changing the character of global ICT policy negotiations. Even when developing countries and civil society organizations are allowed to participate, they frequently have limited impact on the outcome of the conference (Global

Contract, 2003; MacLean, 2003; Cogburn, in-press). Frustration with these processes has even led to drastic actions by developing countries in some fora, such as the walkout from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in Cancun (Economist, 2003). Neither developed nor developing country interests are well served by this continued imbalance in the world-system (Sachs, 1999; Soros, 2000; 2002).

### Research Questions and Hypotheses

Out of the multiple issues raised by this intriguing literature, four primary research questions shape this paper: (1) To what extent do transnational policy-actor networks exist within the WSIS policy formulation processes? (2) What is the relationship, if any, between these policy-actor networks and existing epistemic communities? (3) What factors (e.g., region, organizational type) most significantly influence participation in a transnational policy-actor network within WSIS? And finally, (4) What factors (e.g., policy networks or region) most significantly influence effective participation in WSIS? Each of these questions has subsidiary questions and hypotheses that are explored in this study, and are presented below.

#### *Research Question 1*

- To what degree do WSIS delegates report participation in policy networks?

#### *Research Question 2*

- What is the relationship, if any, between these policy-actor networks and existing epistemic communities?

#### *Research Question 3*

- What factors (e.g., region, organizational type) most significantly influence participation in a transnational policy-actor network within WSIS?

- *Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1)* Delegates from developed countries will participate in global policy networks at higher rates than will delegates from developing countries
- *Hypothesis 3.2 (H3.2)* Delegates from developed countries will have a higher perception of the influence of their global policy network than will delegates from developing countries.
- *Hypothesis 3.3 (H3.3)* Delegates from developed countries will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from developing countries.
- *Hypothesis 3.4 (H3.4)* Delegates from private sector organizations will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from other sectors?
- Are these relationships influenced by intervening variables such as age, education, income, experience, and policy focus?

*Research Question 4*

- What factors (e.g., policy networks or region) most significantly influence effective participation in WSIS?
  - *Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1)* Delegates from developing countries will be less effective in WSIS than are delegates from developed countries.
  - *Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2)* Delegates from civil society will be less effective in WSIS than are delegates from all other sectors (i.e., private sector, governmental, and intergovernmental).

- *Hypothesis 4.3 (H4.3)* The more active a delegate is in a policy network the more effective they are likely to be in WSIS.
- *Hypothesis 4.4 (H4.4)* Being linked with an epistemic community is a significant predictor of high effectiveness in WSIS.

For the Geneva WSIS, x persons participated, including x governments, x IGOs, x private sector, and x civil society. The proportions of these summit figures is similar to the proportions during the preparatory processes. While the preparatory processes for the Tunis WSIS are already underway, this article focuses on the Geneva phase of WSIS and its preparatory processes. We structured the study into three parts: (1) survey research; (2) participant observation and, (3) content analysis. The method and design for each of these three parts will be discussed below.

#### *Theoretical Framework*

The theoretical framework adopted in this study draws on this diverse literature and attempts to achieve a balanced synthesis. The specific processes for formulating cyberinfrastructure policy are quite complex and developed country interests are not well served by the continued imbalance in the world-system (Sachs, 1999; Soros, 2000; 2002). In order to encourage and facilitate higher levels of competence, participation, and ownership of these elite decision-making processes by developing countries, US policy and decision-makers need a better understanding of the factors that currently limit their effectiveness and potential solutions that may address these limitations. Based on my previous research and these important recent works, as well as the larger body of literature on regime formation and global governance, the ten propositions that follow represent the underlying theoretical logic that will orient this study.


- (1) Cyberinfrastructure is becoming increasingly important in harnessing the social, political and economic potential of globalization through increasingly innovative applications.
- (2) These innovative applications bring new stakeholders, with new interests, vision, and demands for GII development, into the decision-making and policy formulation processes.
- (3) These new demands feed competing sets of principles and values, and are supported by the work of epistemic communities.
- (4) These principles and values are in turn articulated by members of policy-actor networks interacting as delegates to elite international ICT policy conferences where they mobilize knowledge resource.
- (5) Correspondingly, international conferences are becoming more numerous, complex, diverse, and important to the processes of regime formation and governance of the Cyberinfrastructure.
- (6) International conferences are mechanisms through which participants in policy-actor networks may directly and indirectly influence regime formation at five key stage/points:
  - (a) participation in pre conference planning and agenda setting; (b) organized and knowledgeable conference participation and advocacy; (c) service on drafting committees to formulate final conference rules/agreements, (d) monitoring and promoting post-conference compliance with rules/agreements; and (e) ongoing presence and participation in the key nodal cities.
- (7) The degree to which participants in policy-actor networks are able to wield direct and indirect influence at each of these five stages depends on their own knowledge, skill and abilities, as well as their ability to mobilize external knowledge resources generated by epistemic communities, including data and evidentiary support for their positions, theories

about that data, presentation of well-developed positions, and clearly formulated arguments in support of them.

- (8) If developing country policy-actor networks were better able to harness their internal knowledge resources and to mobilize external knowledge resources from existing epistemic communities and/or to create their own, then they would increase the likelihood that their interests and priorities would be reflected in specific conference outcomes (e.g., final conference declarations and agreements).
- (9) Since the aggregate of these conference outcomes (at a global, regional, and national level) determines the substantive orientation of the emerging regime, if developing countries and civil society organizations are able to influence a significant number of these outcomes, then the principles, values, norms, and rules of the emerging regime will reflect a focus on maximizing social welfare for all, rather than on serving the economic goals of a few.
- (10) ICTs, specifically the socio-technical infrastructure of a collaboratory, can be introduced successfully into global policy formulation processes to assist developing countries and civil society organizations in creating and influencing epistemic communities, policy-actor networks, and international conference outcomes. Over time, this ICT policy collaboratory will have a positive effect on the ability of developing countries to mobilize networked leadership, to participate more effectively in all five stages of international policy formulation processes, and to influence the outcomes of international conferences, thus making them more robust partners in these processes for the United States, and not merely pawns.

These ten propositions are represented below by figure 1.0.

Figure 1.0 Model of Global Regime Formation to Govern Cyberinfrastructure



*Definitions*

Epistemic Communities: Networks of individuals and groups of multiple disciplines possessing expert specialized knowledge of certain crucial phenomena who work in knowledge-oriented “invisible communities” that share a primary commitment to a common epistemic causal model and a common set of political values and work to influence public policy through active advocacy for those political values (formulated from Haas, et al., 1977; Holzner & Marx, 1979; Haas, 1980; 1990;).

Policy-Actors: Delegates to international conferences and international organizations exercising leadership through their representation of a state (both developed and developing countries), the private sector enterprise, and non-governmental organizations.

Policy-Actor Networks: Dense transnational networks of policy-makers and non-state issue stakeholders, policy-actors, (drawn from Bockman & Eyal, 2002; Slaughter, 2001)

interacting as delegates to elite international conferences where they mobilize knowledge resources in an attempt to bring about convergence of interpretive schemas (principles and values) amongst various actors in the process through international “conference diplomacy” (Levy, et al.,1995).

International Policy Conferences: These are international meetings and for a that come in a variety of flavors based on the degree to which they are formal, resource-committing and binding conferences. At the formal end of the spectrum, there are international conferences that formulate formal rules, adopt treaties and agreements. Slightly less formal, are those international conferences that create non-binding principles and values, and promote the formation of international norms. These conferences are mostly organized by formal intergovernmental organizations (e.g., International Telecommunication Union – ITU or World Trade Organization – WTO). However, recently, many important international conferences are being organized by highly influential non-state actors (e.g., Global Information Infrastructure Commission – GIIC, Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce – GBDe, and the World Economic Forum – WEF).

International ICT Policy Conference: An international ICT policy Conference is one that addresses the multiple social and technical policy issues around the development and use of information and communications technologies.

Conference Outcomes: At the close of an international conference, there are identifiable conference outcomes. These outcomes represent the “convergence of interpretation” that the policy-actor networks sought to achieve. These conference outcomes can be formal (treaties, agreements), semi-formal (conference declarations), or informal (chair’s conclusions or conference summary). Some conferences have a combination of these outcomes. Divergent

interpretations are almost never included in the conference outcomes – with the rare occasion of publishing dissenting conclusions or stakeholder conclusions.

International Regime: The most simple, consensus definition of an international regime, is “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given areas of international relations” (Krasner, 1983). International conferences help to create an international regime through their role in facilitating the convergence of interpretation of policy-actors about these issue areas.

### Method

Three primary data collection techniques, both quantitative and qualitative, were used to triangulate the findings of this study. The primary data collection technique is an international survey of participants in the WSIS process. (Two secondary techniques, participation observation, and content analysis, were also conducted, but are not reported on in this paper).

#### Survey Research

A survey of global ICT policy leaders was conducted by the principal investigator from November 24, 2003 – January 29, 2004 using a commercially available web-based survey tool.<sup>2</sup> The survey was pilot tested in person by a convenience sample of delegates during Prepcom 3 in September, 2003. Numerous modifications to the survey were made based on the pilot test and observation of the participants completing the survey.

A sampling frame was developed from the published lists of participants to the three WSIS Preparatory Committee meetings (Prepcom 1, Prepcom, 2, Prepcom, 3, Prepcom3a) in Geneva and the ad hoc Content & Themes Meeting (Paris). From this initial sampling frame (N= 3,190), those delegates with missing e-mail addresses (n=751) were removed, yielding a

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<sup>2</sup> The survey tool may be found at [www.surveymonkey.com](http://www.surveymonkey.com).

smaller frame (N=2,439). In the first automated attempt to create the mailing list, all duplicate addresses were removed (n=414), with the computer randomly selecting which of the duplicates would be kept. Also, several of these addresses were structurally invalid (n=16). It was possible to repair some of these addresses (n=8) based on obvious typographical errors, such as transposed characters and add them to the frame. Several more (n=5) were additional duplicates, one was structurally invalid, and two were incomprehensible. The remaining structurally invalid e-mail address was fixed and added, resulting in a smaller (N= 2,018) but cleaner sampling frame.

The final survey was sent out to this frame on Monday, November 24, 2003 in English (with a brief statement in Spanish and French on the importance of linguistic diversity and an apology for the English-only survey). However, a substantial number of addresses in the frame were invalid (n=331) and were returned. A database was created that included data for those delegates that were sent the invitation, and those that never received the invitation (based on invalid e-mail addresses and returned mail) which yielded our final actual sampling frame (N=1687). This dataset allowed us to calculate an accurate response rate, as well as allowing us to analyze the specific characteristics of the non-responders.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The database was cleaned extensively by the principal investigator, one doctoral and one master's student. One recurring problem noted in the data cleaning that yielded the bounced back e-mail invitations was transposed characters. If we had caught these problems early enough, some of them could have been addressed. For example, we could have included these corrected addresses in the reminder e-mail sent out in (16 December 2003). However, since the data were only cleaned in February when the survey was already closed, we decided against sending a third reminder.

Of those ICT policy leaders contacted, a substantial number (n=322) responded, resulting in an acceptable response rate (19%) for a web-based elite survey (Sproull, 1986; Kittleson, 1995; Nucifora, 2002; Fricker, & Schonlau, 2002; Drizin, 2003; Alvarez, Sherman & VanBeselaer, 2003). The overwhelming majority of these respondents (n=313, 97%) agreed to participate in the survey, with a very small number (n=9) of “purposeful non-responders,” meaning those who took to time to go to the web-site and answered “No” to the question on the consent form regarding participation in the survey. One reminder invitation was sent out to the non-responders on Monday, 16 December 2003). Finally, the study sample was compared to the final frame and was found to be closely correlated on key demographic variables (e.g., region, organizational type, and gender) giving us a high level of confidence in the survey data. There was a slight oversampling of civil society delegates, so we created a weighted variable to allow us to also analyze the data without it being skewed by the civil society oversample.

The survey contained a total of eighty-three questions (both open-ended, and closed-ended), including three important nested components based on skip logic/conditional questions. The average respondent was asked fifty-eight questions. In addition to individual demographic measures (age, gender, education, training, income, region, race/ethnicity, and language) and organizational characteristics (organizational size and type) the survey included a range of important measures such as, existing levels of trust, experience with ICT tools, levels of satisfaction and success in the WSIS process, experience with ICT policy processes, participation in policy networks, and use and identification of epistemic resources.

#### Participant Observation

The principal investigator of the project traveled to Geneva from September 9-29, 2003 and again from November 10-14, 2003 to attend the Third Preparatory Commission (Prepcom-3)

for WSIS and the Resumed Prepcom-3a as a registered civil society delegate, accredited under International Possibilities Unlimited (IPU), a partner organization to the study. IPU is an international non-governmental organization in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). He also attended the actual Summit from December 7-14 with a team of four doctoral and graduate student researchers from the University of Michigan, registered with ORBICOM, the UNESCO International Network of Chairs and Associates in Communication.

As a registered delegation for Prepcom-3, Prepcom-3a, and the Summit, we were allowed complete access to the conference site, all plenary sessions, public meetings, civil society and business bureau meetings, the cyber café, and limited participation in the private working group meetings (observers were limited to the first five minutes). For the purposes of the study, it was important to engage in observation of the so-called “Frontstage” or the formal public activities, as well as those informal and private activities that occur “Backstage” (Goffman, 1959). Frontstage observations were made of the plenary meetings of the Prepcom, as well as the plenary meetings of the civil society and the Civil Society Bureau meetings. Backstage observations included the coffee shops, meals, and cyber cafe. Notes from these observations were included in an N6 database for qualitative analysis.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> N6 is a commercially available software package that allows for in-depth qualitative analysis of text based documents, with extensive referencing features to non-textual material. It allows for in-vivo coding, with tree (axial) or open coding schemas, as well as extensive filtering, searching, and comparisons across the data

## Findings

First to describe our sample participants; the majority of respondents were male (70%, n=180). The modal education level was a master's degree (48.3%, n=125), with a majority (64.1%, n=164) describing themselves as either "Upper Middle" or "High" income in their own countries. Western Europe represented the largest geographic region within the study sample (28%, n=72), followed by Africa (24.1%, n=62). Most of the respondents (68.2%, n=174) did not speak English as their primary language. The overwhelming majority of the participants access the Internet/World Wide Web from "Office or work" (76.2%, n=141). No one reported having no access or that their primary access was via cell phone or PDA, and only a negligible number (1.1%, n=2) reported having their primary access from a "Cyber Café or other public access" terminal. As one might expect from these findings, this means that the vast majority (84.2%, n=154) reported having "Broadband (e.g., LAN/ISDN/DSL/Cable Modem)" access to the Internet/World Wide Web. Finally, a large majority of respondents (72.7%, n=113) reported either "Agreeing" or "Strongly Agreeing" that they "...currently have sufficient technical support for information and communication technologies within [their] organization."

Our first research question asks, "To what extent do the participants in WSIS report participation in a policy network?" Here we are looking for empirical evidence of the existence of policy networks that are active within the WSIS processes. Our survey contains two approaches, indirect and direct. The first approach asks indirectly about participation in policy networks and epistemic communities. We have four *indirect* measures of participation in policy networks. A very large majority (78%, n=136) of respondents either agreed, or strongly agreed that they "work in concert with other experts in [their] field to disseminate [their] ideas to the global ICT policy community?" Most (66.5%, n. =111) respondents see their ideas as being

important or very important in “influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors”. In terms of activity, most of the respondents (64.1%, n=127) see themselves as active or very active within global ICT policy processes, with some respondents participating in more than 20 ICT policy conferences in the past year, and one attending more than 50. However, most of the participants (65.2%, n=122) do not focus solely on ICT policy, but do “participate in other global processes” as well.

The second approach presents a more explicit measure of participation in policy networks. We have one *direct* measure, and start by presenting the following definition of a policy network. “A ‘Global Policy Network’ can be defined as an international network of policy-actors that could consist of governmental and/or non-governmental actors. Frequently, the members of such a Global Policy Network will interact as delegates to international conferences where they attempt to work collectively to influence the outcome of the conference.” After presenting this definition, respondents were asked, “Based on the preceding definition, are you currently involved in a ‘Global Policy Network’ for information and communication technologies?” A majority of respondents (69.1%, n=143), responded that they were currently involved in a global policy network. This response generated skip logic, which asked a series of additional questions to those that responded affirmatively about their membership in policy networks. For example, when asked about the degree to which their global policy network helped them to “influence global ICT policy processes, “ the vast majority (75%, n=90) either agreed, or strongly agreed that it had. Nearly all of the respondents that reported membership in a policy network provided us with the names of these policy networks (n=104) and slightly fewer (n=85), provided details about the origins of these networks (analyses of these fascinating qualitative data will be presented in a subsequent paper).

In addition, most of the members of these policy networks, also reported that their network (74.1%, n=83) was “associated with a group of scholars, scientists, or other continuous source of knowledge and information.” Also, when asked what functionalities respondents would most like to see in an online platform to support their work around WSIS, the most frequently cited feature was “Libraries of all WSIS-related documents” (72.9%, n=132), the remaining top five choices (out of twelve) were as follows: “A site-wide search” (60.8%, n=110), “E-mail alerts or announcements” (50.3%, n=91), “E-mail discussion lists or online discussion forum” (49.7%, n=90), and finally “Calendar tools to schedule meetings with fellow WSIS participants” (42%, n=76). Our personal favorite option, and an important one for the proposed policy collaboratory received much lower support, “The ability to meet with fellow participants through web conferencing tools” (39.8%, n=72).

The second research question for this study expands on the first, by asking: “What is the relationship, if any, between these policy-actor networks and existing epistemic communities? When we asked those respondents that reported participation in a policy network if that network was “associated with a group of scholars, scientists, or other continuous source of knowledge and information,” a large majority (74.1%, n=83) responded affirmatively. Another item on the survey asked, “Within your organization, do you work to generate specialized knowledge on issues relevant to global ICT policy? Here, the vast majority of respondents (78.1%, n=189) reported yes. The self-report measure of the respondents expertise in ICT policy represented a very broad range of experiences, including: international trade, gender equality advocacy, ICT law and policy, policy analysis, social development, intellectual property law, telecommunications, Internet management, communication, and journalism. We also found that “public presentations (e.g., conferences)” were the most frequently cited (34.5%, n=59)

mechanisms used to “disseminate [their] knowledge and expertise to the global ICT policy community.”

Interestingly, the most frequently cited source of knowledge and information used in preparation for global ICT policy conferences is academic and research institutions (70.1%, n=131), closely followed by government resources (67.9%, n=127). However, in terms of actual resources, intergovernmental organizations was the most frequently cited resource, with UNESCO leading, followed by the OECD, ITU, and the World Bank. Interestingly, only a slight majority (51%, n=99) believes that they “have sufficient knowledge and information to be effective in global ICT policy processes.”

The third research question increases in complexity, and asks, “What factors (e.g., region, organizational type) most significantly influence participation in a transnational policy-actor network within WSIS? To explore this question, four hypotheses were developed to be tested using our empirical data. These hypotheses are as follows: (H3.1) Delegates from developed countries will participate in global policy networks at higher rates than will delegates from developing countries; (H3.2) Delegates from developed countries will have a higher perception of the influence of their global policy network than will delegates from developing countries; (H3.3) Delegates from developed countries will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from developing countries; and finally (H3.4) Delegates from private sector organizations will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from other sectors?

To begin our analysis, we ran a crosstabulation of one measure of country status (OECD, measured by membership or non-membership in the OECD) and the Direct measure of membership in a policy network (PN\_MEMBR) described above. We found that a very large

percentage (75.2%, n=88) of developed countries (OECD members) reported being members of policy networks. This is compared to much lower percentage (59.3%, n=54) of developing countries (Non-OECD members) who reported membership (Pearson Chi-Square .01).

[Table 1. About here]

However, when we ran the crosstabulation using a different measure of country status (STATUS, measured by a collection of indicators of developing and developed country status) and the direct measure of membership in a policy network (PN\_MEMBR), we found almost no difference between the percentage of developed countries (69.0%, n=127) having membership in policy networks, and that of developing countries (62.5%, n=15). After further analysis of the variable STATUS, we determined that the variable OECD status is a much more reliable indicator of developing country status than is the variable called “development.”

[Table 2. About Here]

So, if we take the variable OECD as our measure of country status, we accept Hypothesis 3.1 and find that delegates from developed countries do participate in global policy networks at higher rates than will delegates from developing countries.

To test Hypothesis 3.2, we ran a crosstabulation of our reliable measure of country status (OECD) and a measure of the perceived influence of their policy network (PN\_INFLU). Here we found that there was almost no difference between developed and developing countries in the perceived influence of their policy network. The majority of *developed* countries (75.3%, n=58) either “agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that their policy network “helped [them] to influence global ICT policy processes.” This is compared to a very similar response from *developing* countries, where a slightly larger majority (76.2%, n=32) also “agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that their policy network “helped [them] to influence global ICT policy processes.” Based on

this analysis, we reject Hypothesis 3.2, and find that there is no significant difference between the perceptions of delegates from developed and developing countries in terms of their perception of the impact of their global policy network on their ability to influence global ICT policy processes.

[Table 3. About Here]

Hypothesis 3.3, predicts that delegates from developed countries will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from developing countries. We measured policy network linkage with epistemic community in two ways. The first, (EPIS\_MEM) asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that you work in concert with other experts in your field to disseminate your ideas to the global ICT policy community?” The second, (PN\_EPIST), asks “Is your policy network associated with a group of scholars, scientists or other continuous sources of knowledge and information?”

To test this hypothesis, we ran a crosstabulation of development status (OECD) for both of these measures of linkages with epistemic communities. We found that on the EPIS\_MEM variable, there was no significant difference between developed and developing countries. A majority of respondents from developed countries (75.6%, n=71) either “agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that they “worked in concert with other experts in [their] field to disseminate [their] ideas to the global ICT policy community.” A slightly larger majority of respondents from developing countries (84.6%, n=66) either “agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that they “worked in concert with other experts in [their] field to disseminate [their] ideas to the global ICT policy community.” On the variable PN\_EPIST, we found nearly the same results. A majority of respondents from developed countries (68.1%, n=47) reported that their policy network was “associated with a group of scholars, scientists, or other continuous sources of knowledge and

information.” A larger, but not significant, majority of respondents from developing countries (80.5%, n=33) reported that their policy network was “associated with a group of scholars, scientists, or other continuous sources of knowledge and information.”

[Table 4. About Here]

Based on these results, we reject Hypothesis 3.3, and find that delegates from developed countries do not have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than delegates from developing countries. In fact, we have marginal evidence to suggest the opposite.

Next, Hypothesis 3.4 predicts that delegates from private sector organizations will have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than will delegates from other sectors? Here, we ran a cross tabulation of organizational type (ORGTYPE) with both of our variables for linkage with epistemic community (PN\_EPIST and EPIS\_MEM). On PN\_EPIST, we found a nearly perfect correlation between private sector membership and membership in an epistemic community (100%, n=6). However, the small sample size of private sector respondents makes this finding less impressive (though private sector participants overall in WSIS are far fewer than from other sectors). A similarly high percentage of civil society delegates (84.6%, n=22) report an association with an epistemic community. Government delegates reported the lowest frequency of linkages with epistemic communities (63.9%, n=23).

[Table 5. About Here]

When examining our other variable measuring linkage with epistemic community (EPIS\_MEM), we found no significant differences between organizational type. For example, percentage of private sector (75.0%, n=6) was similar to civil society (74.3%, n=26), with government delegates reporting only a slightly larger frequency (79.4%, n=54).

Based on this analysis, we can neither accept nor reject Hypothesis 3.4, and find only slight evidence to suggest that delegates from private sector organizations have stronger linkages with epistemic communities than delegates from other sectors?

The final research question asks, "What factors (e.g., policy networks or region) most significantly influence effective participation in WSIS? To explore this question, four additional hypotheses were generated to be tested with our empirical data. We have four measures of effective participation (that will eventually be aggregated into one composite/scale outcome variable to be used with regression analysis). The first measure (IDEAINFL), asks, "How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?" The second measure (ORGSUCC), asks, "How successful has your organization been in getting specific language into the WSIS policy formulation process?" The third measure (DP\_IMPAC), asks, "Please indicate your response to the following statement, 'I have had a significant impact on the *WSIS Declaration of Principles*.'" Our final measure of effective participation (AP\_IMPAC), asks, "Please indicate your response to the following statement, 'I have had a significant impact on the *WSIS Action Plan*.'" "

To begin testing these hypotheses, we ran four sets of cross-tabulations using our predictor variables and our four measures of effective participation. The first predictor variable was country status (OECD), the second was membership in a policy network (PN\_MEMB), the third and fourth were our two reliable measures of linkage with epistemic community (EPIS\_MEM and PN\_EPIST).

Here, we find that there appears to be a significant relationship between membership in an epistemic community and the perceived influence of one's ideas on the global ICT policy community.

[Table 6. About Here]

There also appears to be a relationship between membership in an epistemic community and getting specific language into the WSIS policy formulation process.

### Discussion

What are the implications of that emerge from this study. We have shown that there is significant evidence to support the assumption that global policy networks are clearly active within the UN World Summit on the Information Society. The specific character and nature of these networks is yet to be determined, and will be explored in future studies. However, based on our analysis thus far, we find that numerous delegates are working within these policy networks to disseminate their ideas into the policy process, and are attempting to use these policy networks to influence the global ICT policy processes. Perhaps part of the explanation for their continued involvement in these networks is that the vast majority sees them as being highly influential to their success at international ICT policy conferences. However, many of these delegates are not focused solely on ICT policy issues, but most spend their time divided between other policy matters as well. We look forward to analyzing the details of the origins, character, and structure of these policy networks in future work.

The second most important set of implications of this work, is that not only do policy networks exist in global ICT policy processes, but most of them are clearly linked with knowledge producing networks – epistemic communities – and/or seem their primary role as producing knowledge and information to support the international policy decision-making process. The respondents argue that by presenting papers at conferences, they are making a major contribution to the knowledge available to the decision-making process. This finding is particularly interesting, when from our participant observation; we see so many of the arguments

contributed to the process as being “emotionally” driven, rather than “data-driven.” The latter of which has been shown to be far more significant in influencing policy change. However, from this data, we also continue to see the important role played by some of the leading international organizations (i.e., UNESCO, OECD, ITU, and World Bank) at producing knowledge and information that these multistakeholder policy-actors see as important. Also, it was interesting that government delegates reported the lowest frequency of linkages to epistemic communities; again, one needs to further analyze the data to look for factors that might have influenced that outcome as well.

Also, as expected, we find a significant relationship between geographic region and membership in a policy network, with delegates from developing countries being much more likely to be a member of a policy network, than are delegates from developed countries. However, perhaps the most surprising finding in this work appears when we push this finding further into linkages with epistemic communities. Here, we find much less of a development effect than we might expect. Many respondents from developing countries reported membership in policy networks and as well as linkages with epistemic communities. While unexpected, this is good news. On the surface, one might say, well this shows, even with membership in a policy network and linkages with epistemic communities, developing countries are still “pawns” in the process. However, what I would argue – and as I will in slightly more detail in the conclusion – is that these existing networks and linkages can perhaps be strengthened significantly, but the principled and strategic uses of information and communication technologies. Also, until we analyze the impact on effective participation through more sophisticated multivariate techniques, I will be less confident in the overall impact of development status on variables like actual impact, satisfaction, and overall influence on the process.

It remains to be seen, if these policy networks are organic – meaning that they have emerged on their own in order to deal with the specific policy issues emerging from WSIS; or if they are being “pulled” into being because of the opportunity to participate in WSIS.<sup>5</sup> This study also does not address the significant tensions that exist within the policy networks active in WSIS, including within specific stakeholder groupings, such as the most heterogeneous grouping of all – the WSIS civil society.

### Conclusions

We believe that this is an important research program in a number of ways. It contributes to the literature on global governance, regime theory, and provides empirical evidence in support of one of the major debates within the international studies literature on the relative importance of power versus knowledge in influencing regime emergence. Our findings thus far already provide empirical evidence documenting the existence of both policy-actor networks in the global ICT policy world, as well as their linkages to existing epistemic communities. This research program also contributes to a growing stream of literature exploring the emergence of transnational civil society and particularly its use of information and communication technologies. Here, we are particularly contributing to a better understanding of the computer-mediated communication patterns and existing mechanisms of geographically distributed collaboration within this transnational civil society. Ever further, we are linking these findings to existing theories of computer supported cooperative work and computer supported collaborative learning.

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<sup>5</sup> Special thanks to my doctoral student, James Howison, for reminding me of this possible avenue of thinking; as discussed in the work of Keck and Sikkink (1998).

From a practical perspective, this research program is providing important strategic recommendations for ways to strengthen the development and growth of policy-actor networks involved in global ICT policy, and ways to use new networked organizational forms – such as a policy collaboratory – to enhance their linkages with epistemic communities. Through this work, these international networks of scholars and scientists will be in a much better position to connect with their counterparts in the developing world. Lessons learned in this project will also be relevant for other areas of global governance such as trade, energy, and environmental policy. Also, the potential savings to the world community of finding better ways to use information and communication technologies to organize these global policy processes is tremendous. Especially for a conference organized around ICTs, spending over \$12 million to organize the preparatory processes, which could be greatly strengthened by the use of such policy collaboratories.

We are also linking this entire research project to my on-going Global Graduate Seminar on Globalization and the Information Society: Information, Communication and Development. For six consecutive years, this *Globalization Seminar* has involved global virtual teams of students from up to six universities (three from South Africa and three from the United States) in a “Beyond Being There” experience (Hollan and Stornetta, 1992) of distance-independent learning. Using highly-interactive, rich-mediate webconferencing and collaboration tools, these global virtual teams engage in complex problem solving of information and communication policy and strategy tasks (Cogburn and Levinson, 2003; Cogburn, Zhang, and Khothule, 2003; Cogburn and Zhang, 2004).

Finally, from a policy perspective, this research program may help policymakers to make better decisions internationally. This assertion is grounded primarily in the argument that by strengthening the policy-actor/epistemic community linkages, we will help to facilitate the

development of more data driven policy. Further, by enhancing the role of civil society and developing countries, we are strengthening the human-centered and socio-economic development approaches to the information society; both of which will have a tremendous impact on the continued growth and development of cyberinfrastructure.

### Recommendations

Given these findings, there are several recommendations that we would like to make regarding the potential of policy-actor networks and their participation in global information and communication policy processes.

First: Strengthening the avenues for participation by civil society and developing countries in the participatory processes of global ICT policy. Great strides have been made to open up these global policy processes such as WSIS, and to allow civil society organizations an actual “seat at the table” of decision-making, and to support the efforts of developing countries in these processes. However, to date, they are still inadequate.

Second: Related to the first recommendation, the international organizations – both private and public – that organize these international meetings should provide new and innovative mechanisms for organizing, structuring, and convening these meetings. Participation by geographically distributed participants must be a high priority. This is an avenue where innovative applications of information and communications technologies

Third: Finally, I would argue that the concept of a “policy collaboratory” were we bring together lessons learned and best practices from the decades of experiences of physical scientists doing highly complex collaborative work, as well as those lessons emerging out of distributed communities of software designers could help to evolve this emerging organizational form.

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Appendix A: Tables

Table 1.

Membership Status in OECD \* Based on the preceding definition are you currently involved in a "Global Policy Network" for information and communication technologies? Crosstabulation

			Based on the preceding definition are you currently involved in a "Global Policy Network" for information and communication technologies?		
			No	Yes	Total
Membership Status in OECD	Non-OECD Country	Count	37	54	91
		Expected Count	28.9	62.1	91.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	40.7%	59.3%	100.0%
	OECD Country	Count	29	88	117
		Expected Count	37.1	79.9	117.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	24.8%	75.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	66	142	208
		Expected Count	66.0	142.0	208.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	31.7%	68.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.954(b)	1	.015		
Continuity Correction(a)	5.243	1	.022		
Likelihood Ratio	5.934	1	.015		
Fisher's Exact Test				.017	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.925	1	.015		
N of Valid Cases	208				

a Computed only for a 2x2 table

b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.88.

Table 2.

Developing Country \* Based on the preceding definition are you currently involved in a "Global Policy Network" for information and communication technologies? Crosstabulation

			Based on the preceding definition are you currently involved in a "Global Policy Network" for information and communication technologies?		Total
			No	Yes	
Developing Country	Developing	Count	9	15	24
		Expected Count	7.6	16.4	24.0
		% within Developing Country	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
Total	Developed	Count	57	127	184
		Expected Count	58.4	125.6	184.0
		% within Developing Country	31.0%	69.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	66	142	208
		Expected Count	66.0	142.0	208.0
		% within Developing Country	31.7%	68.3%	100.0%

Table 3.

Membership Status in OECD \* Belief in the influence of policy network Crosstabulation

			Belief in the influence of policy network					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Membership Status in OECD	Non-OECD Country	Count	0	0	10	26	6	42
		Expected Count	.4	1.8	8.1	26.8	4.9	42.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	.0%	.0%	23.8%	61.9%	14.3%	100.0%
	OECD Country	Count	1	5	13	50	8	77
		Expected Count	.6	3.2	14.9	49.2	9.1	77.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	1.3%	6.5%	16.9%	64.9%	10.4%	100.0%
	Total	Count	1	5	23	76	14	119
		Expected Count	1.0	5.0	23.0	76.0	14.0	119.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	.8%	4.2%	19.3%	63.9%	11.8%	100.0%

Table 4.

Membership Status in OECD \* Is your policy network associated with a group of scholars scientists or other continuous source of knowledge and information? Crosstabulation

		Is your policy network associated with a group of scholars scientists or other continuous source of knowledge and information?			
			No	Yes	Total
Membership Status in OECD	Non-OECD Country	Count	8	33	41
		Expected Count	11.2	29.8	41.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	19.5%	80.5%	100.0%
	OECD Country	Count	22	47	69
		Expected Count	18.8	50.2	69.0
		% within Membership Status in OECD	31.9%	68.1%	100.0%
Total	Count	30	80	110	
	Expected Count	30.0	80.0	110.0	
	% within Membership Status in OECD	27.3%	72.7%	100.0%	

Table 5.

What type of organization do you primarily work within? \* Is your policy network associated with a group of scholars scientists or other continuous source of knowledge and information?  
Crosstabulation

		Is your policy network associated with a group of scholars scientists or other continuous source of knowledge and information?		Total	
		No	Yes		
What type of organization do you primarily work within?	Public Authority	Count	3	4	7
		Expected Count	1.9	5.1	7.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
	Government	Count	13	23	36
		Expected Count	9.6	26.4	36.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	36.1%	63.9%	100.0%
	Civil Society	Count	4	22	26
		Expected Count	6.9	19.1	26.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
	Private Sector	Count	0	6	6
		Expected Count	1.6	4.4	6.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	IGO	Count	4	13	17
		Expected Count	4.5	12.5	17.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
	Other	Count	5	12	17
		Expected Count	4.5	12.5	17.0
		% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?	29.4%	70.6%	100.0%
	Total	Count	29	80	109

<p>Expected Count</p> <p>% within What type of organization do you primarily work within?</p>	<p>29.0</p> <p>26.6%</p>	<p>80.0</p> <p>73.4%</p>	<p>109.0</p> <p>100.0%</p>
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Table 6.  
Crosstab

		How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?						
			Very Unimportant	Unimportant	Neutral	Important	Very Important	Total
To what extent do you agree or disagree that you work in concert with other experts in your field to disseminate your ideas to the global ICT policy community?	Strongly Disagree	Count	1	1	0	2	0	4
		% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	33.3%	16.7%	.0%	2.1%	.0%	2.4%
	Disagree	Count	0	0	1	2	0	3
		% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	.0%	.0%	2.1%	2.1%	.0%	1.8%
	Neutral	Count	1	4	15	4	3	27
		% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	33.3%	66.7%	31.9%	4.2%	17.6%	16.0%
	Agree	Count	1	0	25	59	8	93
		% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	33.3%	.0%	53.2%	61.5%	47.1%	55.0%
	Strongly Agree	Count	0	1	6	29	6	42
		% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	.0%	16.7%	12.8%	30.2%	35.3%	24.9%
Total		Count	3	6	47	96	17	169

% within How important have your ideas been in influencing the perspectives of global ICT policy actors?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
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